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I. INTRODUCITON
Indonesia had been severely affected by Asian economic crisis in 1997. At that time, Indonesia 
experienced multidimensional economic problems including large current account deficit and 
exchange rate depreciation. An increase in uncertainty pushed the capital out, followed by 
liquidity problem in many banks. As the lender of last resort, Bank Indonesia provided liquidity 
borrowing for the banks, nevertheless, these led to increase in money supply and trigger 
hyperinflation.
One possible source of the crisis in 1997 is that the central bank was not independent. 
In previous political regime (Order Lama), the central bank always financed the government 
budget deficit by printing money. During the new regime (Order Baru), the central bank was 
mandated to support the government’s goals to sustain economic growth and to reduce 
unemployment. Accordingly, it was very difficult for the Bank Indonesia to pursue price stability 
as its main objective. Later in 1999, Bank Indonesia became legally independent, along with 
the rising awareness and also theoretical and empirical evidencethat independent central bank 
is required to achieve price stability. This was also a recommendation of the IMF for economic 
recovery after the crisis. Through Law No.23/1999 the central bank responsibility hadbeen more 
focus from multiple objectives to single objective of price stability.
The basic theory of the central bank independence is inflation bias theory. Inflationary 
bias reflects price instability that will determine the basic prices of all economic activities. It will 
affect the economy through the purchasing power of the national currency. With unstable prices, 
people worry about the real value of their money being discounted by inflation. Furthermore, 
unstable price will increase uncertainty and create economic instability.
However, appointing a conservative central banker to pursue the price stability is debatable 
since many researchers find different results. Some researchers suggest that the central bank 
independence can create low inflation, while the other found no correlation between Central 
Bank Independence (CBI) and inflation. Generally, a negative correlation between legal CBI 
index and inflation is found in the industrial countries while in the developing countries, it is 
not significant. On the other hand, the governor turnover of central bank as informal indicator 
of CBI is generally positively correlated to inflation in the developing countries but it is not 
significant in the industrial or developed countries.
The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between CBI and inflation 
in Indonesia using annual data from 1970 to 2006. This research uses two indicators of CBI; 
legal index and TOR constructed by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapty (CWN) (1995). We use 
two models; Ordinary Least Square (OLS) by using partial adjustment model and Engel Granger 
Error Correction Model (EGECM) to identify the impact of CBI on inflation, and to investigate 
the long-run equilibrium of inflation. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I is theoretical adjustment for 
central bank independent. In section II, the research presents previous empirical evidence of 
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the central bank independence effect on price stability. Section III discusses the result found in 
Indonesia. The last section is conclusion and policy implication.
II. THEORY
2.1. Basic Model of Central Bank Independency
Inflation bias occurs under discretionary monetary policy where central bank is controlled or at 
least intervened by government. Within this condition, if central bank knows public expectations, 
he tends to create inflation surprise to increase seignorage income and to push real economic 
activity; employment and output. However, in the next period people will no longer believe 
the central bank and set higher expectations. Inflation will be higher than it should have been 
as inflation is a function of expected inflation. In this case, the central bank is perceived to not 
be credible, hence it will be more difficult to manage inflation.
There are three reasons why central banks should be independent; first, public choice 
theory explains that central banks get political pressure from a government to finance the 
government budget deficit through easy money policy (Eijffinger 1997). Second, when fiscal 
authority is dominant, monetary authorities will not be able to control government budget 
deficit, hence the supply of money become endogenous. This condition is possible when the 
central bank is not independent (Sargent and Wallace, 1981 cited in Eijffinger 1997). Third, 
there is a ‘time inconsistency’ problem, where the policy is no longer optimal to respond the 
original plan (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogoff, 1985). 
 One solutionfor the inflation bias is to delegate monetary policy to an independent 
‘conservative’ central banker (Rogoff, 1985; Barro and Gordon, 1984; Walsh, 2003). Central 
bank is independent when he is free from political pressure or government intervention, 
including free from the government’s temptation to increase seignorage by increasing money 
supply, (Alesina andSummers (1993). Moreover, independent central bank should only has single 
objective; price stability, which implies that central banks focus more on inflation than output 
growth. Within this framework, the central bank can formulate monetary policy to achieve 
price stability, independent from any political interference (Ahsan, 2006; Pollard, 1993). 
The central bank is also not allowed to buy government’s obligation in primary market. 
This means the government is not permitted to borrow money from the central bank. The 
government should choose ways within his authorities such as raising taxes, issuing bills, or 
borrowing from conventional banks to finance its expenditure rather than borrowing from the 
central bank.
Before looking at the various result of empirical evidence, this paper provides basic model 
of inflation bias and CBI.We use Rogoff model (1985) as starting point. This model compares 
the loss function between discretionary monetary policy and conservative central banker (by 
356 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, April 2013
rule). Inflation under the discretionary monetary policy is analyzed by Barro and Gordon (1983) 
adopting the Lucas-Island supply function.
where yt is output; yn is natural rate of output; pt  isinflation; pet is expected inflation; and et 
isreal shock. 
Output in this model is a function of labor and capital (Cobb Douglas). When actual 
inflation is greater than expected inflation, the real wages will drop since the expected real wage 
is lower and the firm will absorb employees. On the other hand, whenever actual inflation is 
less than expected one, the real wages will increase and firm will reduce employees. 
Under discretionary monetary policy, the central bank minimizes the following social 
loss function: 
t
e
ttt ayny εππ +−+= )( (1)
Where l is society’s preference for output, and kis constant. Parameter k is imperative in this 
model. Under discretionary monetary policy, on stabilizing output and inflation, the central 
bank will set the output to be around yn+k, while inflation will fluctuate around zero. 
A simple relationship between inflation and the actual policy instrument adopted by 
policy maker gives:
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where Dm is the growth rate of money supply (first difference of the log nominal supply of 
money), and V is the velocity shock. In setting Dm, this model assumes that expected inflation 
is given, supply shock (et) is observable by central bank but not velocity shock (vt); and also et 
and vt  are uncorrelated.
Initially, private sector set wages based on expected inflation. The private agent must 
commit to the nominal wage contract before the central bank set the growth rate of nominal 
money supply. Under discretionary monetary policy, the central bank care about output and 
tries to reduce output variation by choosing inflation. In this case, the central bank has the 
opportunity to create inflation different from private agent’s expectation.
The effect of discretionary policy on inflation rate is obtained by substituting equation 
(1) and (3) into the central bank loss function (2), then take first order condition with respect 
to money growth:
vm +∆=π (3)
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Equation (4) shows that aggregate supply shock occurs since the central bank wants to minimize 
output variability (l) around its target and then result in high inflation. There is a tradeoff 
between inflation and output variability. The more a central bank wants to minimize output 
variability (l), the greater inflation will be (Dm). Private sectors will use this equation as their 
expectation. Therefore, optimal policy depends on expected inflation of private agent’s. The 
expected inflation is formed from observing the aggregate supply shock (e) as follows:
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pe = alk > 0, substitute this into (3) and use (4) to get equilibrium rate of inflation under 
discretionary policy:
Equation 5 shows that positive average inflation rate equals to alk. The determinant of inflation 
bias is distortion (k), the effect of money supply on output (a) and the weight of central bank 
to pursue output objective (l). When private agents are able to anticipate this rate completely, 
it will have no effect on output. 
If monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank (conservative), central 
bank puts weight on inflation, and inflation will be:
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This equation implies that inflation bias will be lower since 1+d>1 or d>0, and this tends to 
reduce the loss function. However, the coefficient of aggregate supply shock (e) is also lower, 
implying the central bank does not respond sufficiently to aggregate supply shock (e). In other 
words, when the central bank cares more about inflation than output stabilization, inflation 
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bias will be lower.Yet, this will lower output stabilization. Based on this result, many researchers 
conclude that lower average inflation can be achieved by assigning a conservative independent 
central bank; however at the cost of lower output stabilization. Thus, a trade-off between lower 
average inflation and high output variability is expected to occur. 
Berger, Haan and Eijffinger (2001) use another simple equation to explain the theory of 
central bank independency (see equation 7). This model adopts the same loss function equation 
and Lucas-Island supply function, and also inflation under rational expectation as in Barro and 
Gordon model. Under discretionary policy type of central bank, inflation is:
The first right hand side term is inflationary bias. When a country has high inflationary bias, it 
implies that a government pushes big surprise on inflation. The second term is the degree of 
stabilization of output shock that will affect inflation. Loss function becomes:
ttt y µχ
χ
χπ
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However, when a central bank is independent or conservative, inflation will be:
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Comparing inflation rate under discretionary policy in equation (7) and conservative (independent) 
central bank in equation (9) shows that inflation can be lower under independent central 
bank than discretionary policy. The key parameter is g and e. When both values are positive, 
inflation rate will be lower. This means that by delegating monetary policy to a conservative 
central banker will create positive value of g and e, thus inflation will be lower. Conversely, 
when g or e  is equal to zero, the central bank has the same preference of inflation aversion as 
the government, implying independency of central bank does not matter. This is in line with 
Eijffinger and Hoebericht (1998):
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where g is the degree of CBI, and as g=1, the central bank is fully independent. 
However, a conservative central banker alone is not sufficient to achieve price stability 
since it provides too little response on the shock. Lohmann (1992) argues that appointing a 
central banker to fight inflation is better idea, but discharges him when the shock is too large. 
This way, the central banker will stay responsive to output stabilization. Walsh (1995) provides 
Gcb
t LLM )1( γγ −+= , 
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alternative solution for inflation bias problem which is known as ‘Optimal Walsh Contracts’. He 
suggestsproviding bonus for the central banker when inflation is successfully reduced, instead 
of appointing a central banker. This approach is more contractual than institutional solution.
2.2. Empirical Evidence
Empirically, whether higher degree of CBI is associated with the lower inflation is still controversial 
among economists. The empirical evidence shows that there is a negative relationship between 
the degree of CBI and average inflation such as Grilli et al (1991), Cukierman et.al. (1992), 
Alesina and Summer (1993), Berger (2000) Jacome (2007), Hayo and Voigt (2005), Hicks (2004), 
Eijffinger et.al.,  (1998).
The correlation between CBI and inflation is described in Figure 1. Switzerland and 
Germany with a high CBI degree have low inflation. In Japan, Canada and Netherlands, their 
moderate CBI degree is associated with average inflation. Similarly, New Zealand with low CBI 
has high inflation. Thus, the higher degree of CBI is associated with lower inflation rate, vice 
versa.
Nonetheless, Luna (2003)claims that there is no correlation between CBI and inflation. 
Using cross-country panel data among 23 OECD countries, he suggests that low inflation can be 
achieved without delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank. A low inflation is 
more related to exchange rate target rather than a conservative central bank. Using institutional 
reform as a proxy for CBI, he detects that price stability was achieved after the implementation 
of independence reform only for Spain, Greece, New Zealand, Portugal and Italy. 
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Figure 1
Relationship between CBI and Average Inflation
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In contrast to Luna, Jong (2002) result finds a negative correlation between CBI and 
inflation in OECD countries. He suggests that the negative correlation appears because of cultural 
factors where people do not like uncertainty. An unclear correlation is found by Campilo and 
Miron (1996) but their result contrast with Luna (2003). Their panel regression across countries 
shows that exchange rate regime is not important to determine inflation. The more important 
factors are economic fundamentals such as openness and optimal tax. 
Pollard (1993) has the same result but finds that an independent central bank will harm 
economic growth. He argues that an independent central bank can increase policy conflict 
with a government since they have difference preferences; and if this is evident, the economic 
growth will be lower.
Economists not only focus on whether CBI promotes price stability, but also whether it 
responds to economic performance. Waud (1995) points out that CBI will improve the trade-
off between inflation and economic performance as assumed in Philip curve. An independent 
central bank can create low inflation and low growth as well. However, Fisher (cited in Eijffinger 
(1997)) argues that the tradeoff occurs only in the short term. In the long term, the Philip 
curve is vertical, implying monetary policy will only influence inflation; hence there is no clear 
correlation between CBI and output.
Those various outcomesmay be originated from different measures of CBI. Seminal work of 
Bade and Parkin’s (1988) measures the relationship between the central bank and government 
as ‘budgetary’. They create an index based on the institutional relationship between central 
bank and government.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) presented another index known as the GMT 
Index, based on political and economic independence measures. Using government deficit that 
financed by central bank, they found negative correlation between CBI and inflation.
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) introduce the CWN index. They divide the 
measurement into two categories; Central Bank Independence (CBI) legal index and the rate 
of turnover of the central bank governor (TOR). The legal CBI index is significantly negative 
correlated with inflation in developed countries, but is insignificant for developing countries. TOR 
is positively correlated in less developed countries but uncorrelated in industrial countries. 
The measurement of CBI adopted in many empirical studies has augmented the diversity 
of the substantial result to explain the effect of CBI on inflation.Alesina and Summer (1982) 
and Jacome (2001, 2007) adopting the expansion index of GMT and CWN results a negative 
correlation between the CBI and inflation. Panagiotidis (2005) confirms the same result using 
the CWN index for the case of Greece. 
Voig (2005) adopts the degree of de facto of central bank as measurement of CBI and 
finds negative correlation between CBI and inflation. However, TOR as an informal proxy for 
CBI provides a positive correlation. 
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Campilo and Miron (1997) actually found the same result as Cukierman (1992) but 
reached a different conclusion. They claim there is no correlation between CBI and inflation 
because they find that CWN index was negatively significant only in high income countries and 
positively insignificant in developing countries. When they pooled the sample together, the 
result is unclear. This is similar with Cukierman (1992) who found the index is only significant 
in developed countries. 
The other reason why empirical evidence provides different results is different exchange 
rate regime. A country with fixed exchange rate regimewill lose its independence; conversely, 
strong effect of CBI on inflation can be found on a country under the floating exchange rate 
(Cukierman 2001).
Empirical model and estimation technique are other possible source for different result.. 
Many previous studies find there is a positive or no correlation between CBI and inflation 
because they use an econometric methodology that does not account for error in the proxies 
of index. Consequently, the results show spurious estimation. For example Campilo and Miron 
(1997) and Ismihan and Ozkan (2004) estimate inflation directly on the proxy of CBI using 
ordinary least square (OLS) without calculating the error on the CBI index. They find there is 
no significant relationship between CBI and inflation.
Brum (2002, 2006) suggests that the problem in such estimations can be solved by analysis 
of the covariance structure. This method calculates an error in CBI index. Thus, the estimation 
will produce an unbiased estimator. Based on the empirical evidence, Brum (2002) uses this 
method to estimate Campilo and Morin (1997) and Ismihan and Ozkan (2003) model, and 
find CBI is significant negatively correlated with inflation even in developing countries sample. 
Hicks (2004) uses the ARIMA process and produces a negative correlation between CBI and 
inflation.
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Variable and Data
The dependent variable (inflation) is proxied with Consumer Price Index (CPI). Independent 
variables contain of legal index of central bank independence (legal CBI), turnover of central 
bank governor (TOR), money supply (M1), exchange rate (ER) and lag CPI;the latter three are 
control variables. All data are annual from 1970 to 2006.
The inflation rate was measured as the log of annual percentage in Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). The CPI data were taken from International Financial Statistic (IFS) based on CPI for 17 
capital cities from 1970 to 2006 by using the base year of 1993.
The independence index covers both low (close to zero) and high degree of independence 
(close to one). This way, this research is able to include all data from 1970 until 2006 without 
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having to divide them in two categories before and after independence law (Law No. 23/1999) 
was released.
(Scales)
0.0
Too dependence Too independence
1.00.5
The legal index of central bank independence for Indonesia was formulated by Cukiermen, 
Webb and Neyapty (CWN Index). This index is measured based on 16 characteristics, generated 
from the relationship between the Bank Indonesia and the government. The characteristics are 
categorized into four main clusters; first is Chief Executive Officer (CEO), which contains proxies 
for governing period and dismissal of the central bank governor, who appoints the governor, 
and his/her capability to hold another office. Second is the policy formulation variable; contains 
proxies for who formulate policies, final decision involvement, and the degree of the central 
bank’s participation in formulating the government budget. The third is central bank objective 
variable; contains question whether central bank has single objective (price stability) or multiple 
objectives (price stability, growth, unemployment). The fourth is the limitation of central bank’s 
lending to government; contains proxies for advances and securitizes lending, the authority 
of central bank to regulate the term of maturity of lending, the potential borrowers from 
central bank, the type of lending limitation, the maturity of loan, interest rate of the loan, and 
prohibition of central bank to buy government securities in primary market.
Using these 16 variables, the index of CBI is calculated with scaling method. The scale 
lies between 0 (zero) and 1 (one)2. For the period of 1970 to 1998, we use index calculated by 
Cukiermen, Webb and Neyapty (1995) for some developed and developing countries including 
Indonesia.Legal CBI index from 1999 to 2006 were primary data, collected through survey in 
Bank Indonesia. The set of questions are the same as in CWN index. 
Another indicator used in this research as the measurement of independence is turnover 
of central bank governor (TOR). CWN suggest turnover of central bank governor as an informal 
indicator to measure independence. This idea based on the assumption that the higher governor 
turnover, the greater the possibility of central bank’s dependence on the political authority.This 
assumption occurs only in developing countries, and not in countries with stable authoritarian 
government such as Denmark and United Kingdom, (Cukiermen 1995). 
The turnover of the central bank governor (TOR) is measure based on the average change 
of the governor in years. More specifically, Cukiermen (1995) noted the formula as:
Average Annual Turnover of central 
bank governor
=
Number of years
Number of governor changes
2 The calculation is available on the author upon request.
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The critical value of average annual TOR lies between 0.2 and 0.5. This is due to the electoral 
cycle in every four or five years. If electoral cycle is less than four years, the probability of the 
threshold is higher than 0.5; conversely, it will be lower than 0.2 when the electoral cycle 
is more than five years. For Indonesia case, the threshold of turnover rate before 1970 was 
unstable, hence lies probably between 0 and 0.6. After 1970, the critical range is probably 
between 0 and 0.2. 
The first control variable used in this research is narrow money as proxy for money 
supply. The second control variable is an exchange rate variable which is predicted also has a 
significant correlation with inflation. Both money supply and exchange rate data are gathered 
from International Financial Statistic (IFS). Another variable is inflation expectation, proxied with 
lag of log CPI, which is expected to have a positive correlation with current inflation. 
3.2. Estimation Technique 
Initially we identify the correlation between two indicators of central bank independence 
included in the model using Spearman’s correlation. Gujarati (1995) suggests that all explanatory 
variables should be independent each other or they have low correlation. If they are strongly 
correlated, they are not be able used as independent variables together. Conversely, if they 
are weakly correlated, we can put them together as independent variables. The next step is 
estimating the equation using Ordinary Least Square (OLS):
Panagiotidis (2005) estimates transformation inflation on indicators of CBI (Legal CBI and 
TOR) and dummy (capturing different regimes such as Bretton Wood System, Flexible Exchange 
Rate mechanism and Maastricht regime). On the other hand, this paper estimated inflation on 
both indicators of CBI and money supply and exchange rate as control variables. 
Estimating equation (10) using OLS probably subject to spurious estimation when the 
included variables have unit root. Following Enders (2004), the alternative is first-difference form.
Furthermore, to anticipate the autocorrelation issue, we put lag of inflation to see correlation 
of change in previous inflation on change in current inflation. Lag of inflation is reasonable 
theoretically, since we can see the relationship between expected inflation and inflation. These 
considerations will lead us to the following empirical model: 
 )()1( 4321 erLogmLogTORLegalCBIcPI αααα ++++= (10)
ttt
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erLogdmLogd
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Based on Gujarati (1995) and Wooldridge (2006), we can use this model as long as there is no 
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity problem. Although d(P1(-1)) depends 
on et-1 and all previous disturbance terms, it is not correlated to the current error term et. 
Therefore, as long as et is serially independent, d(P1(-1)) will also independent or uncorrelated 
to et. 
The model satisfies the OLS assumption especially for nocorrelation between explanatory 
variables and stochastic disturbance term. We check the serial correlation problem with 
Godfrey- Breusch Test known as the LM-test. We use white heteroscedasticity test for the 
heteroscedasticity problem and see the correlation test for the multicollinearity problem. 
Further stationarity check on the error of equation (12) is important to find out whether 
the variables in equation are cointegrated, meaning there is a long run relationship among 
the variables on the model, (Enders, 2004). There are two types of ECM we can use; Engel 
Granger Error Correction Model (EGECM) and Wickens-Breusch Error Correction Model, as 
explained below.
For the Engel Granger ECM, first we estimate the residual error term: et = yt-a1-a2x1 and, 
 11 ˆˆ −=∆ tt εβε  then a simple ECM can be formulated as  tttt uxy ++∆+=∆ −1321 εˆααα . If we 
assume Autoregressive Distributed Lag (1):
The equation (13) is the typical Engel Granger Error Correction Model, where -lECt-1 is known 
as error correction term and l is speed of adjustment parameter. The larger value of l, the 
greater the adjustment of previous deviation to the long run equilibrium; conversely, the lower 
value of l imply small short-run adjustment of deviation back to equilibrium. Following above 
procedure, we can specify our empirical model of Engel Granger ECM as:
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The second error correction specification is Winkens-Breusch Error Correction model. 
This model can explain long-run relationship between dependent and independent variable, 
and furthermore provide alternative valid way to test misspecification of presumed model.
Recalling equation (13b): 
ttttt erdmdTORdCBIdPId ))(log())1(log()()()( 21000 ββββα ++++=
ttEC ελ ++ −1  (14)
Following this equation, the empirical model of Winkens-Breusch is specified as:
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Since there is endogeneity problem in the model, we need to use Two Stage Least Square 
(TSLS); hence a set of instrumental variables (IV). 
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Preliminary inspection shows all variables in first difference (inflation, central bank independence 
index, governor turnover, money supply and the exchange rate) are stationary. The residual of 
the model is also stationary, which confirm the presence of cointegration among the variables. 
We also test the correlation between legal CBI index and TOR (turnover of central bank governor) 
by using Spearman’s correlation test. The result shows both indicators are weakly correlated 
(0.28). 
tttttt erdmdTORdCBIdPIdPI ))(log())1(log()()()( 543210 λλλλλλ +++++=
ttttt ermTORCBI ελλλλ ++++ ))(log())1(log()()( 9876  (16)
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The estimation result is presented below.We have checked the model is free from serial 
correlation problem using Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (F-statistic = 0.632533 
and p = 0.538934). The hypothesis of there is no serial correlation in the model cannot be 
rejected at 5 percent level tested by using Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (see table 
3). Using correlogram Q-statistics and White’s test, we also confirm the model is free from 
heteroscedasticity problem.
Most of the variables are statistically significant at 5 percent level except TOR and the 
lag of inflation. The value of  indicates that the variation of independent variables can explain 
88.16 percent of the dependent variable’s variation. 
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The estimation result shows the legal central bank independence (CBI) inversely related 
to inflation, which is typically a characteristic of developed countries. This is the opposite of 
common findings; where for developing countries, the correlation between legal CBI and 
inflation is insignificantly negative. We obtain similar result when using Engel Granger Error 
correction model; both indices of central bank independence are also negative and significant, 
with similar magnitude (minus 0.78). 
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The negative coefficient of CBI shows the lower independency, the higher inflation will 
be. The lower the degree of independence is, the weaker the central bank to refuse government 
intervention. On this situation, the Central Bank simply implements policy set by the government. 
Fiscal authority is more dominant than monetary authority. Based on Sargent and Wallace 
(1981) if the fiscal authority is dominant, the monetary authority will be forced to work under 
the government instruction. Thus, inflation will be higher since the government focuses more 
output or unemployment. Before Central Bank Independence Act No 23/1999, this is evident 
for the case of Indonesia. 
Prior the implementation of this law, Bank Indonesia (BI) institutionally and practically 
depended on government. Bank Indonesia also hadother target such as promoting economic 
growth and reducing unemployment beside its core target on stabilizing price and Rupiah. 
Because of these many objectives, Bank Indonesia functioned as government’s cashier or a 
part of government, including as agent of development. With this twin functions, BI was more 
difficult to realize its target, thus, the inflation was high. For example in period 1970-1984 
the average inflation rate was 18 percent annually. Indeed, in 1972 until 1973, inflation was 
25.80, 30.63 and 41.03 percent respectively (IFS, 2008). 
Figure 2 shows the co-movement of inflation and interest rate from 1974 to 2006. In 
1970s, the inflation rate was still high and the government took tight money policy. The result 
is inflation reduced below the level of 1960s but still above 10 percent. In 1974, inflation rate 
was 41.03 percent, mainly due to multi objective of central bank; stabilizing price and as agent 
of development, which provide unlimited liquidity for the government. 
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In 1980s the inflation performance was stable with inflation below 10 percentand 
interest rate of around 15 percent. This achievement was obtained through stabilization and 
rehabilitation program, followed by financial deregulation and the monetary program such 
as enabling conventional banks to set their own interest rate. In 1988, government issued a 
deregulation packet known as ‘Pakto’88’, providingeasier procedures to set up new bank and 
eventually lead to large increase number of banks.
Before 1999, there are several evident of the non-independency of Bank Indonesia. 
One of them is the weakening of Bank Indonesia’s power when the government formed the 
monetary council, comprising the governor of the Bank of Indonesia, the minister of trade 
and the minister of finance (Raharjo 2002). This will restrict the flexibility of Bank Indonesia to 
formulate its own monetary policy, and also reflecting the non-independency on formulating 
its target. Within this framework, Bank Indonesia as the monetary authority was allowed to 
have various monetary policies; however the implemented policy is subject to government 
agreement(Bank Indonesian report, 1966-1984). 
Another case was in October 1996 and April 1997, when the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of BI advised the governing President Suharto to liquidate some banks, but refused (Aris 
Munandar 2004). The government argued this bank liquidation would create economic instability 
due to the start of election, and eventually Bank Indonesia gave dispensation to those banks 
to operate. One year ahead, 1997, the Asian financial crisis occurred.
Beside external factor, the source of economic crisis in 1997 is the government budget 
deficit financed by foreign debt. As part of the government, Bank Indonesia always signed 
every debt contract for the government (Sitorus 2007). The amount of debt (private and official 
loan) increased every year (seeTable 3), and when the Rupiah depreciated, Indonesia suffer 
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Figure 2
Inflation and Interest rate in Indonesia
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from a sudden increase of foreign debt. The effect of foreign debt to inflation is similar with 
the effect of moneyprinting. Theoretically, financing deficit through foreign debt will reinforce 
inflation in the long term, particularly under fixed exchange rate regime(Harkness, Uriarte 
1985; Budina, 2001). Without independency, Bank Indonesia will not be able to control the 
government budget deficit.
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Trough law No 23/1999, BI is independent. Under this regulation, appoint and dismissal 
of central bank chief executive officer is decided by the discretion of central bank board of 
governor. Under this law, Bank Indonesia is prohibited to buy the government securities in the 
primary market to avoid an increase in the money supply. Moreover, this act also guarantee 
the target independency of Bank Indonesia; single objective of price stability. 
Post this legal independence, the inflation rate decreased. The Bank of Indonesia exercised 
tight money policy and successfully reduce inflation rate from 77.63 percent in 1998 to 2.1 
percent in 1999. Average of inflation was around 8 percent from 1999 to 2004. In 2005, the 
economy suffered from high inflation (17.11 percent), due to the oil price increase. This was 
the highest inflation rate during the post crisis period 1997/1998. In 2006 Bank Indonesia 
implemented Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF), and successfully reduced inflationclose to 
its target of 6 percent and the exchange rate was Rp 8500 per USD. Nevertheless, this level 
of inflation was still higher than other developing countries such as Malaysia and Thailand of 
only around 2 percent.
Many attempts had been made by Bank Indonesia to provide better policy conduct. 
First is switching the government spending from non-budgetary to budgetary side. Second is 
converting interest rate subsidy for liquidity credit into government budget (Djiwandono, 2001) 
and third is directly intervening the foreign exchange market to stabilize Rupiah. The latter is also 
exercised by Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation (GSIC). The result is the appreciation of Rupiah (Achjar, 2001). 
The second measure of central bank independency is the governor turnover. AS presented 
earlier, the coefficient of central bank turnover (TOR) is statistically insignificant, which contradict 
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to initial hypothesis, even has correct positive sign. Generally, the higher frequent of central 
bank governor turnover, the lower degree of independence and the higher inflation will be 
(Cukiermen, Webb and Neyapty, 1995). A positive correlation between TOR and inflation is 
because political instability affects the central bank instability as well, since the election of central 
bank’s governor is affected by political transition. The indicator TOR is relatively stable before 
the crisis, 1997. The election cycle of 5 years for the central bank is similar with the cycle of 
government election. During the transition process (reformation, 1998-1999), the position of 
a central bank governor was major concern of political party; as when Suharto was replaced 
by B. J Habibie, J. Soedradjad Djiwandonowas also replaced by Syahril Sabirin (Sabirin 2008) 
at the same time.
Worth to mention that even the central bank independence exist by law, Bank Indonesia 
needs de-facto independence;the government intervention made by Abdurahman Wahid (the 
fourth president of Indonesia) to replace the elected Governor Shahril Sabirin in 2000 is one 
of the sample. Such intervention will lead to political instability and weakenthe Indonesian 
currency. The governing period of 5 years is too short the central bank to form long-term 
policies in order to achieve price stability (Panagiotidis, 2005). A possible option for Indonesia 
is to run the governor election in every 10 years as in Federal Reserve of United States, or every 
7 years as Deutsche Bundesbank in Germany. 
As presented on Table 2, the Engel Granger Error Correction model confirms the long-run 
relationship among inflation, exchange rate, money supply and the central bank independence. 
The speed adjustment coefficient is 0.37, showing a quite fast correction of inflation deviation 
to its long long-run equilibrium. As in standard model, the Engel Granger ECM also explains 
the legal CBI index inversely affect inflation while TOR is positive insignificant. The short-run 
change in both control variables are also significant in affecting inflation; a short run increase 
of money supply will increase inflation significantly, while short-run depreciation of Rupiah 
will raise inflation. 
Even though the result of estimated model is different from common findings in developing 
country, but we can find similar result in Greece, where legal CBI is negatively and significantly 
correlated to inflation,(Panagiotidis, 2005). He also found that TOR is also positively correlated 
to inflation in lower significant level. 
V. CONCLUSION
This research analyzes the relationship between the central bank independence (CBI) and inflation 
in Indonesia by using two indicators; legal CBI index and turnover of central bank governor (TOR). 
The conclusion of this paper is the central bank independencyinversely affects the inflation. 
The implication is straightforward for the Bank Indonesia to strengthen its independency to 
achieve low targeted inflation. 
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There are several limitations of this paper;first, it is important to internalize the Central Bank 
Independence Act No.23, 1999, directly into the model and find out how the implementation of 
this law affect the marginal effect of CBI on inflation; second, related to estimation technique, 
it is important to apply other method such as Wickens-Breusch model, which believed can 
work better. 
372 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, April 2013
Ahsan, 2006. ‘Central Bank Independence & Governance (CBIG) and Inflation in Asia Pacific’.
Ahsan, 2006. ‘Determinants of central bank independence and governance: Problems and 
policy implications’, JOAAG,, Vol. 1 (No. 1).
Annonynomous 1996, ‘Angka Inflasi di Zaman Orla dan Orba’, Kompas Online http://www.
kompas.com/9609/07/EKONOMI/angk.htm.
Arismunandar 2004, ‘Refleksi 50 Tahun Bank Indonesia: Menuju Independensi Demi Pencapaian 
Misi dan Visi(Reflection of 50 Years of The Bank of Indonesian: Independence in Pursuing 
Vision and Mision)’.
Bade and Parkin, 1988. ‘Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy’. Department of Economics, 
University of Western Ontario, Mimeo.
Barro and Gordon, 1983. ‘A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model’, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 4, Aug. 
Barro and Gordon, 1984. Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, 
“NBER Working Papers (1070).
Berger, 2000. ‘ ‘Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence’. CESifo 
Working Paper Series, No. 255.
Berger, Haan and Eijffinger, 2001. ‘Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and 
Evidence’, Journal of Economic Survey, Vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, 
Budina, 2001. ‘ Inflation Stabilization, Fiscal Deficits, and Public Debt. Journal of Economic 
Literature. E63, F34, E52, E41
Brumm, 2002. ‘Inflation and Central Bank independence revisited’, Economics Letters, 77 
(205–209).
Campilo and Miron, 1996. ‘Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries’, Working PAper 
5540.
Cukierman, 1992. ‘Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy 
Outcomes’, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 6. No. 1: 35J-J9J.
Cukierman, 1995. ‘Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy 
Outcomes’, The World Bank Economic Review., Vol. 6. (No. 1: 35J-J9J).
referenceS
373The Effect of Central Bank Independence on Price Stability: The Case of Indonesia
Cukierman, 2006. ‘Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past 
Present and Future’, Central Bank of Chile Working Paper,(360).
Eijffinger, 1997. ‘The New Political Economy of Central Banking’, Center for Economic 
Research,.
Eijffinger, 1998. ‘ Central Bank Independence: A Sensitivity Analysis, “ European Journal of 
Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), page 73 - 88, February.
Fransisco, 2003. ‘Time-Inconsistent Monetary Policies: Recent Research’, FRBSF Economic 
Literature
Grilli at al, 1991. ‘ Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial 
Countries, Economic Policy, 13, pp. 341-392.
Guerrero, 2007. ‘Japan’s Deflation: A Time-Inconsistent Policy in Need of an Inflation Target’, 
Journal compilation.
Hafild, 2000. ‘Addicted to Loan: The World Bank Foot Prints in Indonesia’, Briefing Paper
Hayo and Voigt 2005, ‘ Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System’. Journal 
of Economic Letter.
Hicks, 2004. ‘Does Institutional Change Matter?The effect of central bank reform on inflation’, 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, 
Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois.
Hutabarat, 2005. ‘The Determinant of Inflation’, Occasional Paper No. 06.
Ilyas, Achjar 2001.”Independensi Bank Indonesia Menuntut Akuntabilitas yang Tinggi”.
‘Indonesia: Economic and Social Update November 2007’, 2007.
Ismihan, 2004. ‘Does Central Bank Independence Lower Inflation?’, Economics Letters, 84 
(3).
Jacome, 2007. ‘Is there Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation?Evidence 
from Latin America and Caribbean’.European Journal of Political Economy.
de Jong. E 2002. ‘Why are Price Stability and Statutory Independence of Central Banks Negatively 
Correlated? The Role of Culture. European Journal of Political Economy, 18, 675 - 694.
Juhro, 2007. ‘Karakteristic Tekanan Inflasi di Indonesia: Pengaruh Dinamis Sisi Permintaan-
Penawaran dan Prospek ke Depan (Characteristic of Inflationary Pressure in Indonesia: 
Demand - Supply Side Dynamic Effect in Advance)’.
Lohmann, S. (1992). The optimal commitment in monetary policy: credibility versus flexibility, 
in “American Economic Review”, 82, March, 273-286.
Lonnberg, 2008. ‘Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence’, Working Paper 13.
374 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, April 2013
Luis I. J´acome H., 2007. ‘Is there any link between legal central bank independence and inflation? 
Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean’, European Journal of Political Economy.
Luna, 2003. ‘Central Bank Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from 23 OECD-countries’, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 60: 410–422
Murray, 2008. ‘ Measuring inflation – methodology and misconceptions’.
Panagiotidis, 2005. ‘Central Bank Independence and Inflation: the Case of Greece. Journal of 
Economic Letter. E.58, E. 52.
Pollard, 1993. ‘Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance’, Economics Papers,(21-
36).
Prescott, 1977. ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’, The Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 85, (No. 3, pp. 473-492).
Rahardjo, 2000. ‘Independensi Bank Indonesia dalam Kemelut Politik (Bank Indonesia’s 
Independence in Political Turbulence)’.
Restepo, 2000. ‘Central Bank Independence and Inflation: The Case of Colombia, 1924-
1998’.
Rissal, 2000. ‘Independensi dan tuntutan transformasi Bank Indonesia’.
Rogoff, 1985. ‘ The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target 
Author(s). The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Nov., 1985), pp. 1169-1189 
Published by: The MIT Press
Sabirin, S, 2008. ‘Pejuang Independensi Bank’. The Hero of Central Bank Independence 
Indonesia’.http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/syahril-sabirin/index.shtml
Samiei, 1999. ‘Central Bank Independence and Conduct of Monetary Policy in United Kingdom’, 
IMF Working Paper.
Summers, 1993. ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some 
Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,, Vol. 25, (No. 2, pp. 151-
162).
Swasono, 2000. ‘Independensi Bank Indonesia Yang Terbukti Runyam (The difficulty of 
Indonesian Central Bank)’.
Tambakis, 1999. ‘Effective Central Bank Independence and the Inflation-Output Trade-Off’, 
Journal of Macroeconomics,, Vol. 21 ( No. 4, pp. 729-753).
The Bank of Indonesia, 2008.” The Historical of The Bank of Indonesia (1966-1983)
The Bank of Indonesia, 2008.” The Historical of The Bank of Indonesia (1983-1997)
The Bank of Indonesia, 2008.” The Historical of The Bank of Indonesia (1997-1999)
375The Effect of Central Bank Independence on Price Stability: The Case of Indonesia
The Bank of Indonesia, 2008.” The Historical of The Bank of Indonesia (1953-1959)
The Bank of Indonesia, 2008.” The Historical of The Bank of Indonesia (1999-2005)
Triampella, 2005. ‘Central Bank Independence and Inflation: the Case of Greece’, Discussion 
Paper Series,(7).
Uriarte, 1985. ‘Transnational Banks, and the Dynamics of Peruvian Foreign Debt and 
Inflation.’.
Vázquez, 2005. ‘Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence 
from Latin America and the Caribbean’, IMF Working Paper.
Voigt, 2005. ‘Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System’, ICER Working 
Papers,(2).
Walsh, 1995. ‘Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers’, American Economic Review.
Walsh, 2003. ‘Monetary Theory and Policy (Second Edition), Cambridge US and London UK: 
The MIT Press,
Waud, 1995. ‘Central Bank Independence and the Output-Inflation tradeoff’. Journal of 
Economics and Business, Elsevier, Vol. 47(2), page 137-149, May.
Webb, 1995. ‘Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence’, The World Bank 
Economic Review, VOL. 9, (NO. 3 ): 397-423.
376 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, April 2013
This page is intentionally left blank
